Some legal regimes leave gaps in the protection provided by the law to …rm investors. This paper considers the decision by a …rm to opt out of the law and bridge those gaps using contracts. Examining the charters of a sample of Mexican …rms, we …nd that private …rms often enhance signi…cantly the protection o¤ered by the law to their investors, but public …rms rarely do so. To explain our …ndings, we construct a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that …rms provide, using as springboard the assumption that legal regimes di¤er in their ability to enforce precisely …ltering contracts, namely, contracts that provide protection only in those cases where expropriation can occur. Our model generates predictions about the types of contracts that would be employed and the levels of investor protection that they would provide across di¤erent legal regimes in both private and in public …rms.
Introduction
Much evidence suggests that the level of investor protection provided by a legal system has important economic consequences. The higher is investor protection provided by the law, the more developed are the …nancial markets (La Porta et. al. 1997 , and the faster is economic growth (King and Levine 1993 , Beck et. al. 2000 , Mahoney 2001 ).
This evidence is at odds with some basic theoretical considerations. A direct application of the Coase Theorem yields that, absent signi…cant transaction costs, capital suppliers and users should negotiate, agree, and privately contract on the e¢ cient level of investor protection, when that level is not provided by the law. 1 The possibility of …lling in the gap left by the law by contractually "opting out" of it should, in principle, make the resultant investor protection e¢ cient across all legal systems. This, in turn, should render immaterial the level of investor protection provided by the law, contrary to the …ndings.
This ostensible Coasian puzzle assumes, however, that di¤erent legal systems are equally adept at strict enforcement of contracts. A possible resolution to the puzzle then suggests that a legal system with low investor protection provided by law is associated with courts that are anemic in the enforcement of contracts that enhance investor protection (see Glaeser et. al. 2001 , La Porta et. al. 1999 , Djankov et. al. 2002 .
We begin this paper by taking the previous argument to the testing ground of the Mexican legal system. 2 We …rst note that Mexican law provides scant protection to its investors and, therefore, leaves a need for contractual opting out to supply that protection privately. Now, if the Mexican legal system is also inept at enforcing contracts, then opting out of the law should rarely be observed; it would be of little use anyway. If, on the other hand, the Mexican legal system is adept at enforcing contracts, then opting out by private contracting should accompany virtually all types of capital supplied by investors to users. We …nd neither.
We construct a sample of all …rms that went public in the Mexican stock exchange from 1992 to 2000. For each …rm in the sample, we examine the charter that was in e¤ect at the time of the IPO and the charter preceding it.
We observe three regularities.
First observation: When privately held, over half the …rms o¤er their investors signi…cant protection beyond that provided by Mexican law. This is a clear manifestation of contractual opting out from the law. It also indicates reliance of the contracting parties on the Mexican courts to enforce those contracts.
Second observation: When going public, virtually no …rm provides signi…cant investor protection to its public investors beyond that provided by the law. This seems to contradict the …rst observation. If supplemental private contracting of investor protection is needed in Mexico, and if the Mexican courts can be relied upon to enforce such contracts in private o¤erings, then why are similar contracts not written when Mexican …rms go public?
Third observation: When providing protection to investors, the contingencies on which Mexican …rms contract are straightforward, especially when compared to U.S. investor protection contract provisions, which tend to be distinctly more intricate. 3 For example, Mexican …rms employ simple …nancial restrictions on their behavior, while U.S. …rms employ more sophisticated accounting based restrictions. Thus, whereas a Mexican …rm would provide veto power to investors in cases of capital expenditures greater than a certain amount, a U.S. …rm would include provisions that prohibit capital expenditures when the ratio of tangible to intangible assets falls below a certain level. Additionally, U.S. investor protection contracts employ inexplicit restrictions on …rm actions that seem to rely on the courts'aptitude to enforce them judiciously in order to ful…l their protective purpose in a way that would not have been possible had those contracts, and therefore the courts, been restricted to consider only simple, explicit contingencies. By contrast, Mexican …rms in our sample do not use similar inexplicit contingencies in their investor protection contracts. Instead, they contract on clearly delineated descriptions of …rm behavior.
To illustrate, U.S. …rms would prohibit transactions with a¢ liates, unless their terms are at least as favorable as those that are obtainable in an arm's length transaction. On the other hand, when
Mexican …rms try to commit not to expropriate investors in sales that are unfavorable to the …rm, they simply give veto power to investors in all transactions involving the sale or purchase of brand names, technological know-how or patents.
In order to explain the observed …rm contracting behavior and to resolve the derivative Coasian puzzle, we present a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that …rms provide.
We consider a single agent, an insider, who initially wholly owns and controls a …rm, through which he tries to raise equity from investors in order to …nance a new project. To accomplish that, the insider may want to commit ex-ante not to expropriate investors ex-post by o¤ering them an investor protection contract.
Rather than assume that legal regimes di¤er in the default level of protection that the law provides to investors, as is commonly done in the literature, we assume instead that each regime is characterized by the set of contracts that it can enforce. Motivated by the observed di¤er-ence in intricateness between U.S. and Mexican investor protection contracts, we assume that legal regimes di¤er in their ability to enforce precisely …ltering contracts, i.e., those that provide protection only when it is necessary; in the eventualities that expropriation can occur, and only then. 4 A legal regime that is more adept at enforcing precisely …ltering contracts will be said to have a higher …ltering-precision.
For example, certain legal regimes can enforce a precisely …ltering contract that provides rights to investors in all cases when "tunneling of assets occurs." 5 In other legal regimes, however, the only investor protection contract that is enforceable is that which provides rights whenever "assets are sold."This characterization of legal regimes according to their enforceable contract set is very much in the spirit of Co¤ee 2001 , which refers to a "smell test" that courts in common law legal regimes can perform to detect expropriation, unlike civil law legal regimes that cannot.
Imprecisely …ltering investor protection contracts may generate errors of two types. One type of error occurs when investors should have been protected by the contract, but are not;
an underinclusion problem. The other type of error arises when investors are granted staying power over bene…cial …rm actions in eventualities when there is no danger of expropriation; an overinclusion problem. For example, a contract that, in order to protect investors, indiscriminately bars all sales of assets would prevent e¢ cient ones as well.
Thus, with only imprecisely …ltering contracts at his disposal, the insider faces a tradeo¤ in choosing the level of investor protection. On one hand, increasing investor protection generates two bene…ts: It increases the …rm's pledgeable income, preventing possible ex-ante costs of underinvestment. It also reduces the extent of expropriation that, in and of itself, is assumed to be ine¢ cient. On the other hand, increasing investor protection also generates costs by preventing the …rm from taking e¢ cient actions in some cases. 6 We propose then that in a low …ltering-precision legal regime, when a small number of investors provide capital privately to the …rm, the insider, constrained to choose from a menu of imprecisely …ltering contracts, would tend to o¤er to them contracts that are overinclusive. By doing so, the insider captures the attendant bene…ts without incurring the costs of preventing e¢ cient actions due to the possibility of renegotiation that a small number of private investors presents. Once a situation arises in which the contract empowers investors to block the …rm from taking an e¢ cient action, renegotiation ensues, appropriate side-payments are made, and e¢ cient actions are taken.
By contrast, when the number of investors is prohibitively large to allow successful renegotiation, as in a publicly held …rm, the overinclusion cost associated with imprecisely …ltering contracts remains. Insiders would then tend to shun overinclusion and they would tend to underinclude instead. These implications of the model are consistent with our …ndings that …rms in Mexico are more likely to provide rights to their private investors than to their public ones. We use our model to explain cross country variation in investor protection provisions, like those aforementioned that are observed between Mexico and the US. We compare the types of investor protection contracts that are expected to be employed across di¤erent legal regimes for public and for private …rms.
Our model implies that due to their inability to renegotiate contracts, public …rms are disadvantaged by being constrained to using imprecisely …ltering contracts, and hence the level of investor protection that they provide would be sensitive to the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate. As …ltering-precision decreases, the level of contractual protection provided by public …rms will decrease as well. In contrast, since private …rms are able to renegotiate their contracts, they …nd imprecisely …ltering contracts to be good substitutes for precisely …ltering contracts. Thus, private …rms would tend to provide high levels of investor protection regardless of the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate. It follows that while, on average, private …rms will provide greater contractual investor protection than public …rms, this di¤erence should decrease in the …ltering-precision of the contracts that …rms employ.
As the underlying …ltering-precision of legal regimes would be di¢ cult to observe directly, it is important to operationalize our theoretical predictions. First, our assumption about the variation in …ltering-precision across di¤erent legal regimes should be re ‡ected in a cross-country variation in the …ltering-precision of contracts that …rms actually use to provide protection to their investors. 6 We use the term precisely …ltering contract because it allows e¢ cient actions while blocking expropriation.
Second, the level of contractual protection provided by public …rms should be positively correlated with the …ltering-precision of the contracts with which this protection is provided. That is, if we observe a legal regime in which public …rms provide high levels of investor protection through private contracts, we would expect this protection to be provided through precisely …l-tering contracts. Related to this, while private …rms should provide more protection to investors than public …rms, the di¤erence between the amount of investor protection provided by private …rms and public …rms should be smaller in legal regimes where precisely …ltering contracts are employed.
To explain the variation in investor protection provision by private …rms, we introduce more structure in our model by considering the provision of e¤ort by the insider. While the ability to renegotiate contracts solves all ex-post ine¢ ciencies, and hence allows all e¢ cient actions to be taken, the use of renegotiable imprecisely …ltering investor protection contracts would dampen the insider's ex-ante incentive to exert e¤ort. The reason, in the spirit of Aghion and Tirole 1997, is that due to the power accorded to them by the imprecisely …ltering contract over …rm actions, investors would be able to extract during ex-post renegotiation some of the rents created by the insider's ex-ante e¤ort. Essentially, investors are holding up the insider in those eventualities where, although no expropriation occurs, the imprecisely …ltering contract provides them with overinclusive rights.
Thus, when managerial initiative is important, an additional consideration is introduced when private …rms decide what level of investor protection to o¤er. Providing protection through the use of imprecisely …ltering contracts will increase the insider's pledgeable income and allow all e¢ cient actions to be taken after renegotiation, but this comes at the cost of diminishing ex-ante insider e¤ort. In private …rms, it is no longer the case that withholding investor protection is dominated by providing it, regardless of the …ltering-precision of the legal regime. Indeed, as the …ltering-precision of the legal regime decreases, private …rms will tend to provide less protection to investors. This is because as …rms can employ only less precisely …ltering contracts, investors' ability to extract rents by holding up the …rm increases, and therefore the cost of insider e¤ort reduction increases.
With this re…nement of the model in mind, it is instructive to compare the disadvantage …rms experience in raising capital along their lifetime when operating in low …ltering-precision legal regimes. The model suggests that it is the young and the mature …rms who would be particularly disadvantaged by the constrains of a low …ltering-precision legal regime. Young …rms will be disadvantaged because managerial initiative is likely to be of particular importance to them.
But since the only way to increase their pledgeable income when raising capital is to provide investors with imprecisely …ltering contracts, managerial initiative would be dampened. Mature …rms would also be particularly a¤ected in low …ltering-precision legal regimes because the option of selling equity in the public markets, for example, for large additional capital expenditures or for diversi…cation purposes, will be costly to them. This is due to their inability to renegotiate imprecisely …ltering contracts with large numbers of investors.
On the other hand, the model suggests that during the middle of their life cycle, when the importance of managerial initiative decreases, …rms will not be as disadvantaged when operating in low …ltering-precision legal regimes. Indeed, by renegotiating imprecisely …ltering contracts they do not su¤er the loss of foregone opportunities, and since managerial initiative is of lower importance, its dampening is not as costly.
Taken together, the analysis has implications for the growth rate of …rms in di¤erent legal regimes across their life-cycle in line with Rajan and Zingales 1998. We predict that the growth rates of the younger and the maturer …rms will be lower in countries with lower …ltering-precision legal regimes, while the growth rates of middle-aged …rms would not vary as much across legal regimes. Once again, the emphasis is not on contractual opting out in an environment with lax investor protection.
Relation to existing literature
Finally, the …nancial contracting literature dealing with the costs and bene…ts of multiple creditors is related to our work in its focus on the problems arising in multi-party renegotiation (see, e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1994).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence; section 3 presents the theoretical model that explains the empirical …ndings and o¤ers further predictions; and section 4 concludes.
Empirical Evidence
Mexican law provides scant protection to investors. This is manifest in the low measure of protection o¤ered by law to equity investors which places Mexico in the bottom 15% in the sample of 49 countries of La Porta et. al. 1998 . 7 Therefore, when Mexican insiders join investors in writing their corporate charters of constitution that stipulate their governance, it should be expected that many will include opting out rules that aim to …ll the gap between the existing and the optimal levels of investor protection.
In order to examine that, we assemble an initial sample comprising all the …rms that went public between 1992 and 2000. Excluding …nancial and government owned …rms leaves 63 …rms. 8 By law, any …rm undertaking an IPO in Mexico must …le its charter of constitution and all modi…cations to it with the Mexican stock exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores). For each …rm in the sample, we look at the charter that was in e¤ect just before the IPO. We call it the "private charter," as it provides rights to private investors. We also look at the charter that replaced the private charter at the time of the IPO. This charter provides rights to the public investors, and therefore we call it the "public charter."
We discard another 16 …rms from the sample because information about them was lacking, leaving a …nal sample of 47 …rms for which we have both the public and the private charters. In addition, our sample includes the ownership structure that was in e¤ect at the time that each charter was written.
The analysis of contractual opting out in the private charters is aided by the fact that the distribution of the degree of investor protection beyond that provided by law is bi-modal in the sense that in almost all cases there is either a signi…cant degree of opting out or no opting out at all.
The following is an example of a case in which the private charter provides additional investor protection (two other examples are included in Appendix A):
In December 1996, GAMI Investments Inc., a subsidiary of Equity Group Investment Inc., purchases 8.3% of Grupo Azucarero Mexicano S.A. de C.V. for $25 million. GAMI Investments is issued a special class of shares -C shares. The charter states that a resolution in a shareholder meeting dealing with any of the following issues must be approved by the C shares: -Merger or acquisition by Grupo Azucarero or any of its subsidiaries in one or more related transactions for an amount greater than $30 million -Sale, rent, or transfer of more than 10% of Grupo Azucarero's or any of its subsidiaries' consolidated assets in one or more related transactions -Share repurchase -Modi…cation to the charter -Long term debt issuance 7 Mexico obtains a score of 1 out of 6 in their measure of equity protection. The average for countries with common law origin is 4, while for countries with French civil law origin it is 2.33. Mexico is part of the latter group. In June 2001, the Mexican law was reformed to provide additional protection to investors; …rms in our sample were not operating under this new legal regime. 8 Additionally, we did not include the single case in which a public …rm spun-o¤ a subsidiary.
-Liquidation of the …rm -Removal or appointment of comptrollers or external auditors -Voting shares of subsidiaries in any of the above issues
In addition, the C shareholders will appoint three members of the board, a majority of which must approve any board resolution dealing with the above issues.
We thus classify a …rm as contractually opting out through its private charter when investors are provided substantial information and control rights, a¤ording them redress against opportunistic insider behavior. These contractual opting out provisions include veto powers provided to speci…c classes; board representation; rights to appoint external auditors and comptrollers; supermajority attendance-quorum requirements and resolution-quorum requirements for shareholder meetings and board meetings; and supermajority requirements for resolutions dealing with speci…c cases such as capital expenditures, sale of assets, acquisitions, …nancing, compensation, general operational activities, and contract approvals. 9 In addition, we examine ownership structures to identify …rms with outside investors, because only those are expected to exhibit contractual opting out. We mark a …rm as having outside investors if there are either two shareholders that do not belong to the same family, or else if no shareholder owns more than 95% of the shares. This is a very conservative criterion; a …rm jointly owned by two brothers, say, one with 90% of the shares and the other with the remaining 10%, is still considered to have an outside investor.
We …nd that of the 47 …rms in our sample, 39 had outside investors when they were privately held. Of these 39 …rms, we …nd that 20-just over 50%-exhibit contractual opting out providing investor protection that is not granted by the law.
When those 47 …rms went public, the private charters were replaced by public ones. In all but …ve of the those public charters, …rms did not provide any protection to public investors beyond what was provided by law, with the exception of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) which we discuss shortly. One of those …ve …rms, Hilasal S.A. de C.V., provided signi…cant additional rights to its investors. Also, two …rms provided a single investor protection enhancing provision in their charters, which although not comparable to the degree of protection o¤ered by Hilasal, we classify as providing non-negligible additional investor protection. The charters of the remaining two …rms include a single right that we consider as providing negligible additional investor protection. 10 We …nd that 16 …rms issued ADRs in addition to the shares issued in the Mexican stock exchange. We do not consider these to be signi…cant cases of contractual opting out. 11 While providing some informational and acquisition-related rights, the degree of investor protection is not comparable to that provided by Hilasal or the 20 …rms in the private case. Furthermore, half of the …rms issued ADRs comprising mostly non-voting shares.
In sum, only one out of the 47 …rms in our sample (less than 3%) signi…cantly enhanced the protection o¤ered to its public investors through contractual opting out provisions, and two 9 There are six …rms that provide only informational rights (mainly board representation to investors which would not have been provided by law). We do not classify these as cases of contractualy opting out.
1 0 Appendix B details the rights that these …ve …rms provide to their investors. 1 1 The most important rights provided by ADRs are disclosure of large shareholders, timely disclosure of material information, restrictions on insider trading, equal opportunity to participate in tender o¤ers, and "fair price" payment to minority shareholders in going private transactions (Co¤ee 1999 ). The acquisition related rights provided by ADRs do not apply to shares traded in the Mexican Stock Exchange.
additional …rms (just below 5%) enhanced this protection in a non-negligible manner. Thus, while just over half of the private …rms use contractual provisions to signi…cantly enhance the protection o¤ered to their investors, practically no public …rm does the same for its public investors. 12 These …ndings suggest that in a country where the legal system provides poor investor protection, …rms do contractually opt out. Second, courts in such countries appear to be able to enforce at least some types of contracts that enhance investor protection. 13 To gain further intuition about …rm contracting behavior, it is instructive to compare the contracts found in our sample of Mexican …rms to existing evidence on investor protection contracts used by …rms in the U.S. 14 In general, it appears that U.S. contract provisions are far more complex than their Mexican counterparts, relying as they do on more sophisticated contingencies.
U.S. contracts often employ sophisticated accounting based restrictions on …rm activities such as investment, asset sales, dividend payments and borrowing. For example, a provision might forbid an acquisition in which the post-acquisition ratio of intangible assets to tangible assets exceeds a certain level or might restrict dividend payments as a function of earnings. In contrast,
Mexican contracts in our sample rely on straightforward value-based contingencies: a minority shareholder is provided power whenever an acquisition is conducted for an amount greater than a certain level, when capital expenditures exceed a certain level, or when the …rm enters into a contract of a duration exceeding a certain minimum. Additionally, while a U.S. …rm would place a limit on dividend payments which is based on …rm earnings, a Mexican …rm would provide power to minority shareholders in all cases of dividend payments.
Further, U.S. contracts employ vaguely de…ned restrictions on …rm actions, which when properly enforced by courts, enable …rms to provide power to investors in complex contingencies which would be di¢ cult to describe contractually. In contrast, Mexican …rms in our sample do not employ similar vague contingencies, contracting instead on clearly delineated descriptions of …rm behavior. Thus, while a U.S. contract might allow asset sales only in the course of normal business activity, a Mexican contract will provide veto power to minority shareholders whenever the …rm sells more than a speci…ed percentage of its assets, or whenever assets are sold for a value greater than a certain amount. Moreover, while a U.S. …rm may place restrictions on a¢ liated transaction by demanding that they occur at terms which are at least as favorable as what could be obtained by an arm's length transaction, Mexican contracts provide power to minority investors in any purchase or sale of brand name, know how, or patent by the …rm.
The …nding that di¤erent contract provisions are used in the U.S. and Mexico may suggest that courts in di¤erent legal regimes di¤er in their ability to enforce contracts and hence …rms 1 2 We …nd that in most cases the outside investors of the private …rms do not leave the …rm when the …rm goes public. Out of the aforementioned 20 private …rms that provided signi…cant investor protection, …ve …rms still provide signi…cant protection to their private investors in their public charters. We do not know whether the remaining 15 …rms stripped their investors of their rights since it is quite possible that these rights were transferred to a private shareholders'agreement. It should be added that the possibility of a private shareholders'agreement only enforces our …nding that contractual opting out does occur with private investors. Of course, private shareholder agreements cannot be written with public investors, so we observe all rights provided to these investors. 1 3 An argument can be made that even though these contracts are written, they will not be enforced. The great detail within charters and the high variability between them seem to suggest otherwise. Furthermore, two …rms out of the 20 that opt out allow the use of arbitration according to the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce for the enforcement of their charters. This would suggest that the remaining 18 …rms choose to use Mexican courts for the enforcement of their charters. 1 4 See Footnote 3 above for sources.
may be constrained to di¤erent sets of contracts when providing protection to their investors.
In the next section we present a model motivated by these observations that endogenizes and explains the observed choices of investor protection enhancement across di¤erent legal regimes in private and in public …rms.
3 The Model
Setup
Consider a …rm faced with an opportunity to invest in a positive NPV project. Choosing to invest an amount I > 0 in the project yields a return of g(I), with g 0 > 0 , g 00 < 0, g(0) = 0, and
We assume that the …rm is cash constrained, so that any amount invested must be raised through outside equity. 15 For simplicity, we assume that the …rm is initially wholly owned by a single agent, whom we call the insider. We also assume that all agents are risk neutral, that the discount factor is 1, and that capital markets are perfectly competitive.
After having sold the equity, the insider has the opportunity to expropriate …rm funds. We assume, as is standard in the literature, that expropriation is wasteful and therefore ine¢ cient (see Burkart et. al. 1997 ). Formally, we assume that the insider can divert a …xed fraction s of the return, from which a part that is equal to a …xed fraction c of the return is wasted.
We further assume that the insider can expropriate wealth from the …rm only when he takes a certain action A, which, in itself, may well be e¢ cient in some states of nature. For example, A could be the sale of …rm assets, which is e¢ cient in many situations, but also presents the insider with the opportunity to expropriate through the practice of tunneling. Formally, we assume that with probability p the action A is e¢ cient, and if taken, it yields an additional positive gross return of B. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the insider cannot expropriate from the additional bene…t B: Obviously, when the …rm forgoes an e¢ cient action it does not get the attendant bene…t. We will call that the cost of forgone opportunities.
As a benchmark to the analysis that follows, we spell out the …rst best outcome of our model. Clearly, the …rst best level of investment I F B solves g 0 (I F B ) = 1. Next, since expropriation is ine¢ cient, it never occurs in the …rst best outcome. Also, the …rst best outcome dictates that action A is taken whenever it is e¢ cient. Finally, since, as we assume, capital markets are perfectly competitive, the insider captures the full NPV of the project, yielding him an expected payo¤ of g(I F B ) I F B + pB. Due to the simplifying assumption that the insider cannot expropriate from the additional bene…t B, we make the assumption that I F B > pB, so that the insider cannot raise and invest I F B by issuing equity against the bene…t B.
We further assume that every legal regime is characterized by a di¤erent set of contracts that can be enforced in a court of law. In each regime, the only contracts that are used are from this set, which we call the enforceable contract set. This is relevant to the insider, who may bene…t from committing not to expropriate. In that case, the insider will o¤er to his investors a contract from the enforceable set describing the degree of protection he is ready to grant them.
We consider a continuum of legal regimes indexed by a …ltering-precision parameter ' that can take values between 0 and 1. In a legal regime with …ltering-precision ', courts can enforce what we term the :EX(') contract. This contract e¤ectively bans expropriation altogether by restricting the insider's ability to act freely within the …rm. However, the restriction may also have the undesired e¤ect of preventing the …rm from taking action A when it is e¢ cient to do so. When enforcing :EX('), a court in a legal regime of …ltering-precision ' is adept at passing through, or …ltering, an e¢ cient action A with probability ', so that the …rm can take that action while still banning expropriation. Consequently, we will say that a legal regime is more precisely …ltering than another, if its …ltering-precision parameter is greater than that of the other. We will similarly say about the contract in the former regime that it is more precisely …ltering than the contract in the latter regime.
In the extreme, in a regime with ' = 0, the only enforceable investor protection contracts are those that completely ban action A, e¢ cient or otherwise. In the other extreme, in a regime with ' = 1, courts can verify when expropriation occurs, and can enforce contracts which speci…cally ban expropriation without banning the action A. For example, in a ' = 0 legal regime, the only contract that is enforceable is one that bans asset sales above a certain amount. On the other hand, a contract banning a¢ liated transactions at favorable conditions would only be enforceable at a higher …ltering-precision legal regime. It should be noted that the set of enforceable contracts changes with ', which is re ‡ected in the dependence on ' of the formulation of the :EX(') contract:
We assume that the insider may also choose not to o¤er investor protection at all. To ease notation, we identify this choice with the null contract that allows the …rm to take the action A unfettered, and we designate it by A. In sum, when operating in a legal regime with …ltering-precision ', the insider can choose between two contracts to provide investors: the :EX(') contract or the A contract.
Using this setting, we analyze an insider's optimal decisions in a public …rm and in a private …rm across legal regimes with di¤erent …ltering-precisions. In a public …rm, equity is sold to a dispersed group of atomistic investors, whereupon contract renegotiation is very di¢ cult; it is ruled out in our model. In a private …rm, on the other hand, equity is sold to a small number of investors-referred to in this paper as the investor -and therefore contracts can be renegotiated.
Both in the case of a private …rm and in the case of a public …rm, we examine how the insider folds back the corresponding decision tree, and then compare and contrast the solutions.
Public …rm
Consider an insider operating in a legal regime with …ltering-precision '. The timeline is shown in Figure 1 , while the full decision tree is shown in Figure 2 . At Stage 0, the insider decides whether to o¤er the A contract, or the :EX(') contract. He then o¤ers for sale a share of the …rm to outside investors. Being competitive by assumption, the investors react by bidding for that share an amount I that is equal to the amount that they expect to receive, which, in turn, is determined by the contract they are o¤ered. This implies that the investors do not share in the project's NPV, which goes entirely to the insider. We will call that equality between the investors' payment and their return expectation, the competitive …nancing constraint. The insider decides to sell that share of the …rm that maximizes the NPV, which he fully captures, subject to the competitive …nancing constraint. 16 Figure
Payoffs distributed
At Stage 1, the …rm invests the I it has raised in the project, and at Stage 2, Nature reveals whether taking action A is e¢ cient or is not.
At Stage 3, if no protection was o¤ered via the contract A at stage zero, the insider can either take action A and expropriate from the returns; take A and not expropriate; or refrain from taking A, whereupon expropriation is impossible. If, on the other hand, contract :EX(') was signed, then the insider cannot expropriate. Also, using the :EX(') contract, when the action A is e¢ cient, and can thus lead to an additional bene…t of B, then with probability ' the court can recognize that, and will allow the …rm to take action A and reap the additional bene…t. Finally, at Stage 4, the …rm prorates the funds that remain to its insider and outside shareholders.
We solve this decision tree by backward induction. At Stage 3, after a history that includes having written the contract :EX('), and having sold a share of the …rm for I, the insider is barred from expropriation. When the action A is e¢ cient, the court allows the …rm to take the e¢ cient action with probability ', and bans it with probability (1 '). In the latter case, the …rm would have liked to renegotiate the :EX(') contract in order to implement action A, but since the …rm is public, it cannot do so. This is the cost of forgone opportunities imposed by the less than perfect …ltering-precision of the legal regime. On the other hand, there is the bene…t that the insider's commitment not to expropriate holds up, and the expropriation ine¢ ciency is eliminated. The …rm therefore earns in expectation g(I) + p'B, and splits it; (1 )(g(I) + p'B)
go to the insider, and (g(I) + p'B) go to the investors.
We recede now to Stage 0. Anticipating their share in the returns, the investors agree to pay 
Since no expropriation occurs under the :EX(') contract, the insider's pledgeable income is high, and hence we show that the insider will successfully raise and invest I F B . Formally, we have Proposition 1 In a public …rm, in a legal regime with …ltering-precision ', when using the :EX(') to curb expropriation, the insider invests the …rst best amount, but takes action A when 
Figure 2.
Insider's decision tree; public firm in a legal regime of filtering-precision ϕ. The Jensen-Meckling condition follows from comparing the insider's payoff on the uppermost branch to his payoff on the branch just below it. 
it is e¢ cient only with probability p', and, therefore, the NPV falls short of the …rst best by p(1 ')B, the cost of forgone opportunities.
Proof
See Appendix C.
To complete the solution of the decision tree, we go back to Stage 3 to the end of an alternative history that includes having written the A contract (instead of the :EX(') contract), and having sold a share of the …rm for I. The insider is then allowed to implement action A. The insider actually implements action A whenever it is e¢ cient, and, irrespective of its e¢ ciency, exploits
A to expropriate if and only if > c s :
This is the standard Jensen-Meckling condition that states that an agency cost arises only when the insider owns a small enough fraction of the cash ‡ow. 17 Receding now to Stage 0, we solve for the insider's optimal share of the …rm that he wants to sell. First, the insider has to maximize his expected payo¤s by choosing under two alternatives: Under alternative (a), the insider solves
where the maximand is the insider's expected payo¤, and the RHS of the competitive …nancing constraint is the expected payo¤ to the investors under the current alternative (a).
Expropriation is re ‡ected in two ways in this maximization problem. First, the (1 c) factor in the maximand represents the expropriation waste. Second, the competitive …nancing constraint becomes tighter. As re ‡ected by the (1 s) factor, investors know that they will be expropriated from. Therefore, they are willing to provide less …nancing (smaller I) for any given …rm share .
When s is large enough, the tight …nancing constraint leads to an underinvestment problem.
Under alternative (b), the insider solves
where the maximand and the constraint are the analogs of those in alternative (a). In this case, there are obviously no ine¢ ciencies associated with expropriation, since it does not occur.
However, the …nancing ability of the insider is limited by the fact that the fraction of the …rm sold may not exceed c=s.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the parameters of the model are such that the insider is led to select the optimal in (c=s; 1]; i.e., that the more interesting alternative (a) obtains.
The agency problem is then severe enough, so that selling a fraction of the …rm that does not 1 7 Equation (2) follows from comparing the insider's payo¤ on the uppermost branch of Figure 2 to his payo¤ on the branch below it. lead to subsequent expropriation causes a severe underinvestment problem. 18 We now have the following Proposition 2 In the public case, when using the A contract, for all p and B there exists an s such that for s > s the insider raises an amount less than I F B .
Proposition 2 and maximization problem (3) indicate that not providing investor protection to investors in a public …rm (i.e., using an A contract) involves a cost and a bene…t. The cost is the waste caused by expropriation (captured by the (1 c) factor in the maximand of (3)) and the possible ex-ante cost of underinvestment. The bene…t is that actions are taken whenever they are e¢ cient, so that the insider captures the full value pB associated with the e¢ cient action.
Thus, in choosing between the :EX(') contract and the A contract at Stage 0, the insider faces the following tradeo¤: Using the A contract allows implementation of e¢ cient actions capturing the attendant bene…ts, but it causes an underinvestment problem when expropriation is severe enough, and also wastes resources through expropriation. By contrast, using the imprecisely …ltering :EX(') contract allows an e¢ cient level of investment without wasting resources through expropriation. However, this contract will occasionally also prevent the execution of e¢ cient actions. This cost of the :EX(') contract, however, is decreasing in the …ltering-precision ' of the legal regime. As …ltering-precision increases, courts are more adept at enforcing contracts which distinguish eventualities in which expropriation has occurred from those in which the insider is undertaking an e¢ cient action, and hence the insider will be prevented form implementing the e¢ cient action with smaller probability.
We thus have the following proposition. Proof See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 states that, on average, …rms within higher …ltering-precision legal regimes would provide higher protection to their investors through the use of more precisely …ltering contracts.
The intuition is that the payo¤ from choosing the :EX(') contract is increasing in ', as the …rm will be more likely to take the action A when it is e¢ cient, while the payo¤ from choosing the A contract is independent of ': Also, the comparative statics in part (iii) of the proposition are understood by the fact that the bene…t of the A contract increases whenever (a) the expected bene…t to taking the e¢ cient action is greater, (b) the underinvestment problem due to expropriation is less severe, and (c) the waste associated with expropriation decreases. 19 1 8 Formally, for all s there exists a c such that for c < c, the insider selects at Stage 0 a greater than c=s. Thus, we require that c is small enough compared to s, so that expropriation is relatively e¢ cient. Clearly, with c = 0 (expropriation ex-post e¢ cient) the insider would always want to expropriate, regardless of : 1 9 It is noteworthy that we assumed that when a …rm awards a :EX(') contract to its atomistic public investors, they will, in fact, enforce it. This assumption needs some justi…cation, as each small investor would prefer not to sue,
Private …rm
The insider's decision tree in this case is similar to that of the public …rm in the same regime, except for the all-important possibility of contract renegotiation that we insert in the decision tree at Stage 2.5, between Stages 2 and 3. The solution is again by backward induction.
Once again, consider a …rm operating in a legal regime with …ltering-precision '. After a history that comprises :EX('), , and I, at Stages 0 and 1, and an e¢ cient A at Stage 2, the insider and the private investor face a joint surplus of B. With probability ', the e¢ cient action A is allowed and the insider implements it. With probability 1 ' the action A is banned, butunlike in a public …rm-the insider and the investor can capture the surplus by renegotiating the :EX(') contract. Indeed, they optimally do. After they successfully Nash-bargain (renegotiate) with power to the investor, they sign a new contract, which stipulates (i) that expropriation is generally still barred, but action A is allowed on the speci…c occasion at hand for capturing the surplus B, and that (ii) the investor shall get a share B from this surplus. In line with the incomplete contracting literature, we assume here that in contrast to when contracting ex-ante (at Stage 1), the use of action A in an e¢ cient manner is veri…able ex post (see Hart 1995 for an extensive discussion). 20 E¤ectively, the investor is relinquishing his right vis-a-vis the …rm in return for a payo¤. In doing so, he is providing slack in those cases in which the courts can only enforce a contract that is too stringent.
Finally, since the :EX(') contract bans it, the insider will never expropriates in this case.
Receding now to Stage 0, the insider solves M ax fg(I) I + pBg
where the maximand is the insider's expected payo¤ (whole NPV), and the RHS of the competitive …nancing constraint is the expected payo¤ to the investor in the current situation.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that the solution of this maximization problem is I F B , the …rst best level of investment. This, together with no expropriation and taking action A whenever it is e¢ cient, implies Proposition 4 Regardless of the …ltering-precision of the legal regime ', providing the :EX(') contract to investors in a private …rm achieves the …rst best outcome, because that contract is renegotiated when necessary.
Proof See Appendix C.
when he bears the potentially substantial costs of doing so, while the bene…ts spread thinly to all other investors. One mechanism that can solve this free rider problem is the class action lawsuit. An alternative mechanism operates when investors accumulate shares at prices that do not fully incorporate the pending enforcement of the investor protection contract. This can be justi…ed either by the assumption that shares can be accumulated secretly, or by the assumption that an accumulator can hide his order for shares within liquidity induced trades as in Kyle 1985 . We provide the details in an earlier version obtainable from the authors.
Back to Stage 3, but after an alternative history that comprises contract A (instead of :EX(')), , and I; the situation is almost completely analogous to the case of the public …rm in the same regime after the same history. We will assume then the interesting case in which the insider's optimal falls in (c=s; 1] , and therefore he would be expected to expropriate.
But he does not. The reason is that also in this situation, the insider and the investor can and do bargain over a surplus that is created as the investor convinces the insider not to expropriate and to save the associated waste cg(I) for the bene…t of both in return for a "bribe."Speci…cally,
with Nash Bargaining, assuming a bargaining power of to the investor, the expected payo¤ to the investor is (1 s)g(I) + pB + cg(I); and to the insider it is [(s c) + (1 ) 
where the maximand is his expected payo¤ from the bargaining agreement, which is also equal to the whole NPV from the project, and where the RHS of the competitive …nancing constraint is the investor's expected payo¤ from the same bargaining agreement.
It is clear why the expropriated fraction s would appear in the competitive …nancing constraint when expropriation materializes on the equilibrium path, as in (3) above. But here, expropriation never materializes on the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, s plays a role in (6) . The reason is that at the time of renegotiation, the insider still has the outside option (as a credible threat o¤ the equilibrium path) to expropriate sg(I) at the cost of wasting cg(I): Thus, through renegotiation, the insider gets (s c)g(I) while dividing cg(I) with the investor.
As s increases, the insider's pledgeable income decreases, the …nancing constraint in (6) tightens, and an underinvestment problem arises. However, since no expropriation occurs, there is no waste of resources. Formally, we have that Proposition 5 In a private …rm, when using the A contract, there exists a c such that for c < c , for all p and B, there exists an s such that for s > s the insider invests an amount less than
Proposition 5 states that whenever the expropriation problem is potentially severe (large s), providing no investor protection (using contract A) generates an underinvestment problem. The requirement for a small c in the proposition stems from the competitive …nancing constraint in maximization problem (6) : as c increases, the insider's pledgeable income increases due to the funds that investors obtain in the renegotiation to avert expropriation. If c is large enough, the insider will therefore be able to invest the …rst-best amount. Following from Propositions 4 and 5 is 2 1 To see this, note that if bargaining breaks down the insider expropriates and his outside option payo¤ is [(s c) + (1 )(1 s)]g(I) + (1 )pB in expectation, while that of the investor is (1 s)g(I) + pB: But if they do agree, then the total pie becomes g(I) + pB; which is larger than the sum of the disagreement payo¤s by a surplus of cg(I):
Proposition 6 When selling securities to private investors, providing investor protection (using :EX(')) weakly dominates not providing it at all (using the A contract). This dominance is strict when the :EX(') contract involves an underinvestment problem.
Proof
Proposition 6 is a direct result of the fact that regardless of whether protection is provided to private investors (under both A and :EX(')), the …rm takes the e¢ cient actions, and expropriation never occurs. The di¤erence is that the …rst best level of investment is achieved with imprecisely-…ltering investor protection (the :EX(') contract), but an underinvestment problem may occur when investor protection is not provided (the A contract).
Solution Summary
The insider faces di¤erent tradeo¤s when o¤ering protection to investors depending on the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which he operates, and depending on whether equity is sold to private or to public investors. An insider of a public …rm, in a regime with …ltering-precision ', faces a tradeo¤ when deciding what investor protection to o¤er-imprecisely …ltering protection (the :EX(') contract) or no protection at all (the A contract). Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, providing protection allows implementation of the …rst best level of investment and prevents expropriation and its associated waste, but it may preclude e¢ cient actions and their attendant bene…ts. On the other hand, providing no protection at all entails the costs associated with expropriation-underinvestment and waste-but allows taking e¢ cient actions more often than when the investors are protected, capturing their bene…ts. The optimal choice, to provide protection or not to do so, depends on the relative magnitudes of these e¤ects.
However, as the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which the …rm operates increases, the loss of foregone opportunities associated with providing protection decreases since more precisely …ltering contracts become available. Thus, the magnitude of the bene…t of providing investor protection to public investors increases with the …ltering-precision of the legal regime and hence more protection will be provided.
On the other hand, the insider of a private …rm has a clear choice. Regardless of the investor protection he provides, either imprecisely …ltering or none at all, due to the possibility of contract renegotiation, the …rm eventually takes e¢ cient actions and the insider does not expropriate.
However, providing imprecisely …ltering investor protection (:EX(')) is more attractive, since providing no protection (A) may lead to an underinvestment problem. The insider would therefore choose to provide protection through the :EX(') contract, and would do so regardless of the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which the …rm operates.
This analysis explains our empirical …ndings in Mexico. Under the premise that the Mexican legal regime is of particularly low …ltering-precision, …rms can only o¤er investor protection contracts that …lter very imprecisely (low '). This premise is also consistent with the type of contracts that are employed by Mexican …rms. In public …rms the bene…ts of taking e¢ cient actions will therefore tend to outweigh the costs of underinvestment and waste associated with expropriation, so that little investor protection will be provided. On the other hand, consistent with the model, …rms will …nd it optimal to provide investor protection to their private investors even when constrained to the use of imprecisely-…ltering contracts, since the possibility to renegotiate with private investors acts to supplement the de…cient …ltering capabilities of those contracts to allow taking of all e¢ cient actions.
Predictions
Our model facilitates the comparison of the types of contracts that would be employed and the levels of investor protection that they would provide across di¤erent legal regimes in both private and in public …rms.
Due to the possibility of renegotiation, private …rms …nd imprecisely …ltering contracts to be good substitutes for precisely …ltering contracts. Thus, we predict that private …rms would provide similar levels of investor protection in di¤erent legal regimes, but in doing so they would employ di¤erent types of contracts. As the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which the …rm operates increases, they would use more precisely …ltering contracts.
In contrast, public …rms, which cannot easily renegotiate the terms of a contract in place, are disadvantaged when they are constrained to imprecisely …ltering contracts, and therefore we predict that the level of investor protection provided by public …rms would depend on the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate, with more investor protection provided in higher …ltering-precision legal regimes (' > ' ).
An alternative way to view our results is the following. Across all legal regimes, private …rms would tend to provide more protection to investors than public …rms. However, since the sensitivity of the level of investor protection to the …ltering-precision of the legal regime is greater in public …rms than in private …rms, the di¤erence in investor protection between private …rms and public …rms would be more pronounced in legal regimes which are less capable of enforcing precisely …ltering contracts.
As the underlying …ltering-precision of legal regimes would be di¢ cult to observe directly, it is important to operationalize our theoretical predictions. First, our assumption that …ltering-precision varies across legal regimes should be re ‡ected in a cross-country variation in the …ltering-precision of contracts that …rms actually use to provide protection to their investors.
Second, the degree of contractual protection that public investors receive should be positively correlated with the …ltering-precision of the contracts with which this protection is provided. That is, if we observe a legal regime in which public …rms provide high levels of investor protection through private contracts, we would expect this protection to be provided through precisely …ltering contracts. Related to this, while private …rms should provide more protection to investors than public …rms, the di¤erence between the amount of investor protection provided by private …rms and public …rms should be smaller in legal regimes where precisely …ltering contracts are employed.
Finally, we predict that if in a legal regime-denote it by X-public …rms do not tend to provide protection to investors while private …rms do provide protection, we would not expect to …nd a di¤erent legal regime-say legal regime Y-in which public …rms provide protection through contracts that are less precisely …ltering than the contracts used in legal regime X. Indeed, such a …nding would serve to contradict our theory: as we would conclude that legal regime X is more precisely …ltering than legal regime Y, and yet we could not explain why public …rms in legal regime X chose not to use the same imprecisely …ltering contracts used by public …rms in legal regime Y.
In testing these predictions, it is important to note that in order to streamline the analysis, our model assumes a perfect Coasian environment: the law does not provide investor protection by default, and all such protection is voluntarily provided through contracts. Thus, when analyzing the data, one would need to control for the default level of investor protection provided by the law in various legal regimes.
Insider Initiative
We have shown that private …rms will always weakly prefer to employ the :EX(') contract, and regardless of the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which the …rm operates, these contracts allow the insider to obtain the …rst best outcome. This is so because private …rms can renegotiate the imprecisely …ltering investor protection contracts when the need arises, and can clear their strictures to achieve the same …rst best outcome that can be achieved with more precisely …ltering contracts. We have used this observation to explain why under the low …ltering-precision Mexican legal regime a large proportion of private …rms provide investor protection, while public …rms virtually do not, and to generate prediction regarding the cross-country use of investor protection enhancement contracts by …rms. However, it remains to be explained why some private …rms do not …nd it optimal to provide investor protection contracts, as we observe in our sample of Mexican …rms.
To explain this observation, we need to introduce more structure into the model in the form of insider initiative. When the returns to the …rm's actions are sensitive to the amount of e¤ort that the insider decides to exert, his incentives will be dampened by the availability of only imprecisely …ltering contracts, even when those can be renegotiated. In the spirit of Aghion and Tirole 1997
and Burkart et. al. 1998 , this e¤ect is due to a hold up problem, whereby the investor extracts some of the rents due to the insider's ex-ante initiative during the bargaining over the surplus created by allowing the …rm to take an e¢ cient action when an imprecisely …ltering contract already in e¤ect bans it. Therefore, in a low …ltering-precision legal regime, a private …rm would optimally provide investor protection when its returns are less sensitive to the insider's initiative;
while another private …rm, whose insider initiative is important enough, may …nd it optimal to withhold investor protection.
Formally, to model a private …rm insider's initiative, we assume that at Stage 2 of the insider's decision tree there are a number of potential projects associated with the action A, which, initially, are indistinguishable to the insider, and from which the insider would only be able to select one.
For example, the action A may be thought of as a strategic decision to acquire another …rm, and each project then represents a di¤erent target.
We assume that with probability (1 p) none of the projects are e¢ cient, while with probability p, one and only one of the projects is e¢ cient, and, when selected, yields an additional bene…t B.
To rule out the case where the insider would optimally choose to perform a project at random we assume that there is always a project which yields a payo¤ of 1.
We introduce an additional stage, 2.5, in which the insider can exert a nonveri…able e¤ort e 2 [0; 1] to obtain information about each project. We assume that when exerting e¤ort e, the insider learns the value of all projects with probability e, while with probability (1 e) the insider learns nothing. The cost of exerting e¤ort e is 1 2 ke 2 , where k parameterizes the cost of insider initiative. Stages 3 and 4 are similar to that in the model presented in the previous section.
At this point, it is useful to describe in greater detail the process of renegotiation between the insider and the investor, before an e¢ cient action is allowed to be implemented, in order to endogenize and compare the shares of the surplus captured by the insider when using di¤erent types of investor protection contracts.
Consider …rst the case of a private …rm where no investor protection has been granted (A), and where the more interesting Jensen-Meckling condition > c=s holds. With probability pe the insider knows the value of all projects and observes that one of them is e¢ cient. Since the insider controls the …rm, he decides whether to implement the e¢ cient project by taking the action A.
The insider can decide to be content with the extant sharing contract, take action A, and get With probability (1 e) the insider does not become informed of the value of the projects, and as explained above, he chooses not to take any for fear of taking the project with 1 payo¤, while with probability e(1 p) the insider is informed of the value of each project but sees that none are e¢ cient, and hence once again does not take any of them.
In addition, as in the original model, the insider will never actually expropriate, instead renegotiating with the investor over the surplus cg 
Consider now the case of a private …rm in a legal regime with …ltering-precision ', where investor protection has been granted through the :EX(') contract. Since the :EX(') bans it, the insider will never be able to expropriate. As in the case of the A contract, with probability
(1 e) + e(1 p) the insider will not undertake any additional project at Stage 3, either because he cannot distinguish between them or because he observes that they are all ine¢ cient. With probability pe the insider observes that one of the projects is e¢ cient. Due to the contract provided to investors, with probability ' the contract will allow the project to pass through (recall that all projects involve taking the action A,) and so, similar to the case described above, the project will be taken, with [1 min( ; )]B going to the insider and min( ; )B to the investor. On the other hand, with probability (1 ') the contract bans the project, so that the insider must …rst renegotiate with the investor in order to clear the ban. Assuming the same bargaining powers as in the previous case, once renegotiation occurs and the project implemented, the insider's agreement share will then be (1 )B and the investor's will be B.
Note that the investor gets at least as large a share of the return of the e¢ cient project (when ), and sometimes a strictly larger share of those returns (when < ) under the :EX(') contract relative to the share that he gets under the A contract.
The insider's expected payo¤ at Stage 4 will therefore be ( We have that at Stage 0, the insider will solve M ax fg(I) I + peB 
Since when < , the insider extracts less of the expected returns of the e¢ cient project under the :EX(') contract than under the A contract, the insider would exert less e¤ort under the former. In addition, when the insider's share of the surplus is equal to both under the :EX(') and under the A contracts, and so he would exert the same level of e¤ort in both cases. It follows that with respect to e¤ort, holding constant, the A contract weakly dominates the :EX(') contract.
On the other hand, as in the analysis without the e¤ort consideration, the A contract involves a smaller pledgeable income as compared to the :EX(') contract, so that, holding e¤ ort constant, the insider would be able to raise any given amount of investment I by selling a smaller fraction to the investor under the :EX(') as compared to the A contract. Therefore, since insider e¤ort is decreasing in the share owned by the investor, it is not the case that e¤ort exertion will always be higher under the A contract as compared to the :EX(') contract:
Also, as in the analysis in the original model in Section 2.3, the A contract involves underinvestment when s is large enough. The insider will therefore trade o¤ the underinvestment and the optimal e¤ort e¤ects when deciding which contract to o¤er to the investor, and unlike the case without insider initiative, the :EX(') contract will no longer dominate the A contract. Indeed we have that Proposition 7 For each set of parameters of the model, there exists a ' 0 such that for ' < ' the A contract dominates the :EX(') contract, while for ' ' the :EX(') contract dominates the A contract. Also, for all k > 0, there exists an s(k) such that for all s < s(k) we have that
As a by product of Proposition 7, once insider initiative is considered, private …rms are no longer indi¤erent to the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate, as precisely …ltering contracts are required to curb expropriation without curbing insider initiative. Indeed, when insider initiative is important, private …rms are particularly disadvantaged when constrained to low …ltering-precision legal regimes. This conclusion is consistent with the stylized fact that venture capital is less developed in civil law legal regimes.
Conclusion
It has been demonstrated that the better is investor protection that is provided by law, the more developed are the …nancial markets and the faster is economic growth. However, if there exists some e¢ cient target level of investor protection, then, from a Coasian perspective, suppliers and users of capital should achieve that level voluntarily by opting out from the law, signing contracts that …ll in the gap between the default and the e¢ cient levels of protection. In doing so, total levels of investor protection should become equalized across di¤erent legal systems, rendering immaterial the level of investor protection o¤ered by law, contrary to the …ndings. A resolution of this Coasian puzzle that is o¤ered in the literature suggests that legal systems that provide poor investor protection by law are also those that are incapable of enforcing contracts that enhance investor protection.
In this paper, we took this argument to the testing ground of the Mexican legal system, where the law provides poor investor protection. Looking at a sample of Mexican …rms, we observe three observations: First, when privately held, over half of the …rms in the sample signi…cantly enhance the protection o¤ered to their investors through contracts. This …nding indicates an expectation that such contracts can and would be enforced when necessary. Our second …nding, which seems at odds with the …rst, is that when going public, virtually no …rm provides signi…cant investor protection to its public investors beyond the default level provided by law. Thus, investor protection appears to be both necessary and enforceable by contracts, yet it is not provided by the public …rm. Our third observation is that the contingencies on which Mexican …rms contract are straightforward, especially when compared to U.S. investor protection contract provisions which seem to be far more complex.
In order to explain the Coasian puzzle in a way that is consistent with the Mexican experience and to explain …rm contracting behavior across di¤erent legal regimes, we present a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that …rms provide. At the base of the model is our assumption that legal systems di¤er in their ability to enforce precisely …ltering contracts that provide protection in those cases where expropriation can occur and only in those cases. When only imprecisely …ltering contracts can be enforced, a public …rm faces a tradeo¤ in choosing the level of investor protection. On the one hand, increasing investor protection generates two bene…ts:
It increases the …rm's pledgeable income, preventing possible ex-ante costs of underinvestment.
It also reduces the extent of expropriation that, in and of itself, is assumed to be ine¢ cient.
On the other hand, increasing investor protection also generates contract overinclusion costs by preventing the …rm, at times, from taking e¢ cient actions.
A private …rm would face a similar tradeo¤, except that due to its small number of investors, contract renegotiation becomes possible. Therefore, in those eventualities when investors'imprecisely …ltering contractual rights would have prohibited the private …rm from taking an e¢ cient action, the parties would circumnavigate the problem by renegotiating the blocking clauses to allow taking of the e¢ cient action. Thus, the overinclusion costs associated with provision of imprecisely …ltering investor protection is greatly mitigated in a private …rm relative to a public …rm, and therefore, in a legal regime that can enforce only imprecisely …ltering contracts, private …rms would tend to provide imprecisely …ltering investor protection more often than public …rms.
Since the tradeo¤s facing private and public …rms when providing investor protection vary with the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate, our model can be used to explain cross country variation in investor protection provisions. Our model implies that due to their inability to renegotiate contracts, public …rms are disadvantaged by being constrained to using imprecisely …ltering contracts, and hence the level of investor protection that they provide would be sensitive to the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate. As …ltering-precision decreases, the level of contractual protection provided by public …rms will decrease as well. In contrast, since private …rms are able to renegotiate their contracts, they …nd imprecisely …ltering contracts to be good substitutes for precisely …ltering contracts. Our model then implies that private …rms would tend to provide high levels of protection to their investors regardless of the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which they operate. However, as the …ltering-precision of the legal regime in which the …rm operates increases, they would use more precisely …ltering contracts.
To explain the variation in investor protection provision in private …rms, we introduced managerial e¤ort to the model. Our main result is that while the ability to renegotiate imprecisely …ltering contracts solves the ex-post ine¢ ciency, whereby some e¢ cient actions are not taken, it does not solve the ex-ante ine¢ ciency of managerial e¤ort reduction. Thus, private …rms in low …ltering-precision legal regimes will face a tradeo¤ in their choice of investor protection provisions: using imprecisely …ltering contracts increases pledgeable income but decreases managerial initiative.
Taking these e¤ects into account, our model suggests that, when raising capital, operating in low …ltering-precision legal regimes is particularly detrimental for young and mature …rms.
Middle aged …rms, where the importance of managerial initiative has decreased and who have yet to require access to public capital markets, will not be as adversely a¤ected.
On a more general level, our model suggests that a possible driving force behind the empirical …ndings relating the level of investor protection provided by law to economic variables, such as growth and …nancial market development, is the …ltering-precision of the contracts that are enforceable in each legal system. Provides rights including supermajority attendance-quorum and resolution-quorum requirements; a requirement for unanimous approval of shareholders to allow any shareholder to use the …rm's know-how, patents, etc.; the right to arbitration according to the rules of the International Commerce Chamber, and no deposit of shares prior to a shareholder meeting.
-Two …rms with non-negligible rights:
The charter of one …rm states that it will not lend or provide a loan guarantee to its parent …rm, and the charter of the other requires a mandatory tender o¤er for 100%
of the shares in case of a transfer of 51% of the shares.
-Two …rms with negligible rights:
The charters of these …rms state only that the deposit of shares before a shareholder meeting is not required. We begin by checking whether = 1 is a solution to the maximization problem. Plugging = 1 into the F.O.C. with respect to I, we obtain that the solution must satisfy g 0 (I ) 1 = 1: On the other hand, from the competitive …nancing constraint we have that g(I ) + p'B = I , which, by the properties of g( ), implies g 0 (I ) < 1: Thus, = 1 cannot be a solution to the maximization problem.
The remaining solution has < 1, and thus = 0: Plugging this into the F.O.C. with respect to I, we see that at the optimum g 0 (I) = 1, or I = I F B : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
De…ne the value functions and Lagrangians associated with the maximization problems (1) and (3) to be: Proofs of all other propositions will be added in the near future.
